

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.284  
23 August 1966  
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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FOURTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 23 August 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

(Romania)

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

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## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. D. SILVEIRA da MOTA  
Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES  
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV  
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV  
Mr. D. POPOV  
Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS  
Mr. C. J. MARSHALL  
Mr. P. D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. T. LAHODA  
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABERRA  
Mr. A. ZELLEKE  
Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI  
Mr. K. P. LUKOSE  
Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI  
Mr. S. AVETTA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Nigeria:

Mr. G. O. IJEWERE  
Mr. M. B. BRIMAH

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU  
Mr. A. COROLANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL  
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD  
Mr. R. BOWMAN  
Mr. V. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN  
Mr. I. I. CHEPROV  
Mr. V. B. TOULINOV  
Mr. A. A. OZADOVSKY

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAFF  
Mr. A. OSMAN

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT  
Sir Harold BEELEY  
Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON

United States of America:

Mr. A. S. FISHER  
Mr. C. G. BREAM  
Mr. A. NEIDLE  
Mr. H. MOULTON

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Romania) (translation from French): I declare open the two hundred and eighty-fourth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): Now that, at the time of our adjournment, we look back at our debates, we must unfortunately note that the balance sheet of this year's work of the Committee once again fails to correspond to the expectations and hopes which we had conceived. At our last meeting the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, described in a comprehensive and well-documented statement the reasons for the difficulties which we have encountered, and indicated clearly on which side lay the responsibility for the failures of this Committee.

The Italian delegation refuses, however, to make any pessimistic judgment. It shares the views of those delegations which, while regretting the lack of concrete results, consider the efforts made by this Committee this year to have been a valuable contribution to the cause of peace. During our discussions all the delegations repeatedly confirmed their countries' will to peace and their desire to arrive as soon as possible at an ending of the arms race and to achieve disarmament. That solemn and unanimous reaffirmation of the aims of our work acquires particular significance in the present circumstances. It shows that the aspiration to peace and the desire for understanding prevail over the clouds which darken the horizon and over all other negative factors.

Our work has further clarified the different points of view and enabled us to go thoroughly into many problems. During this year our work has become more and more realistic. The elements of propaganda or utopianism which have formerly delayed it have to a large extent been dispelled to make way for a concrete and serious approach. Despite a few useless and tedious digressions this Committee, thanks to the goodwill of a majority of delegations, has been able to deal concretely with these problems and also to examine new ideas and interesting technical data. The atmosphere of the debates, apart from the few regrettable digressions, has remained essentially serene and inspired by a spirit of co-operation.

In short, I believe that the existence of this Committee, its methods of work and the progress accomplished in its examination of various questions constitute in themselves -- in the present situation -- factors for peace and reconciliation which are not only useful but also essential. They in themselves justify a positive assessment on the whole, despite the lack of real success in the negotiations.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

As regards general and complete disarmament new ideas have been submitted and our delegation has hastened to support them, as it considered them promising. In this respect it has again supported the idea of setting up a working group with broad and comprehensive terms of reference (ENDC/PV.272); but unfortunately this idea has met once again with Soviet opposition. Furthermore, our delegation also wished to stress the importance which in our opinion attaches to a thorough study of the machinery for peace and of international peace-keeping forces; these elements, which have been somewhat neglected in our discussions, constitute in fact one of the three fundamental pillars of general and complete disarmament.

In the field of collateral measures the large number of proposals put forward by both sides have been carefully examined. Despite persistent and unjustified Soviet objections, the Italian delegation has for its part ventured to recommend --- once again and especially -- freeze measures (ENDC/PV.279), because we consider that in comparison with other collateral measures they are more specific and better balanced, and do not involve too "intrusive" control. We also requested the Soviet delegation, but without receiving any reply, to tell us in what field it would accept freeze measures.

While expounding the Western proposals the Italian delegation did not fail to examine also the proposals of the Eastern delegations. Thus we explained (*ibid.*, p.20) in what way the Polish proposals for denuclearization or a freeze in Central Europe (ENDC/C.1/1; PV.189, p.6) could be improved, since as they now stand they are not acceptable. They obviously affect directly the vast and vital question of European security which has sometimes been mentioned by the Eastern delegations. I should like to assure them that my delegation is foremost in its awareness of this problem. Italy ardently desires that European security should be ensured on balanced, fair and ever more solid and trustworthy bases.

To this end Italy responded positively to the idea of a conference on European security in which all countries already contributing to peace and security in Europe would be invited to participate. We very sincerely hope, on the other hand, that balanced and controlled disarmament measures will soon be adopted in order to render the present situation, in Europe also, more stable and more in accordance with our wishes. But in order to achieve this aim, to bring about a new and better situation in Europe, the active co-operation and goodwill of the countries of the East are essential and necessary.

I cannot regard as a contribution by the countries of the East to European security the repeated proposals of the Soviet delegation regarding the withdrawal of foreign troops and the elimination of military bases. The European situation is well

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known and it is quite obvious that these measures, as the Western delegations have repeatedly explained, which take no account whatever of geographical factors and which if implemented would have very different effects on the two sides, overlook the essential requirements of strategic balance.

I have mentioned Europe first because it is the continent in which we live; but Italy is of course also aware of the security problems of the other continents. While in Asia communist China rejects the appeal that has been addressed to it to take part in a world disarmament conference and is developing an ever more threatening and aggressive policy, reassuring initiatives are being taken in other continents.

The Italian delegation has already pronounced itself in favour of the denuclearization plans for Latin America, and has expressed to our friends in that continent its best wishes for the complete success of their efforts. I should like today to express the same wishes and the same sympathy to our friends in Africa who likewise aspire to keep their continent outside the sphere of the nuclear menace. As is known, in that region the Heads of State have made a Declaration (A/5763), supported by a United Nations resolution (A/RES/2033(XX); ENDC/162), which is worthy of faithful respect from everyone.

Among all the collateral measures of disarmament, the banning of tests and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are those with which the Committee has been most concerned. As regards the first question, new and ingenious proposals have been submitted by the non-aligned delegations and have recently been incorporated in a document (ENDC/177) the importance of which I have already stressed. We are in favour of exploring all ways that may lead to agreement. But what we hope for particularly is that the already less negative attitude of the Soviet delegation towards the value of working out scientific data may, through the subsequent evolution of that delegation's thought, enable a thorough study of the technical issues to be made in this Committee. As the representative of Brazil stated on 26 July, it is becoming increasingly evident that we shall be able to base an objective, fair and guaranteed solution to the problem of nuclear tests only on thorough technical knowledge (ENDC/PV.276, p.18).

Lastly we come to the problem of non-proliferation. It was on this issue that our hopes were most centred, our debates chiefly focussed, and our failure the most keenly felt. As you know, it was over the definition of "control" of nuclear weapons that our efforts met obstacles that they could not overcome.

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The concept of "control" was given a specific definition in the amendment to the draft treaty submitted by the United States delegation (ENDC/152/Add.1) and supported by the other Western delegations. We believe indeed that, so long as the control of nuclear weapons remains in the hands of nuclear countries, any form of co-operation - physical or consultative - within an alliance involves no danger of dissemination. This point of view, as is known, was not accepted by the Eastern delegations. However, they seemed to recognize that there is a difference between possible future physical participation in nuclear responsibilities and consultative participation, which, moreover, is not excluded by the actual letter of the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/164).

The debates on the different points of view regarding the definition of control will no doubt continue. We ourselves believe that a solution is possible through the adoption of a formula guaranteeing the security of all, including the countries of the East. We shall always be willing to contribute actively to such a compromise solution.

Furthermore, the Italian delegation considers that, apart of course from the question of control, agreement already exists or could easily be achieved on many points. The very language of the two draft treaties on non-proliferation is sometimes identical, or at least does not differ greatly. Thus on 1 February the Italian delegation proposed that -

"... the Conference should set up a drafting committee on which all its members would be represented and which would examine side by side the two draft treaties and any amendments that may be submitted. Such a committee should first of all draw up a document comparing the two texts we have before us." (ENDC/PV.236, p.8)

Subsequently the Canadian delegation very usefully submitted to the Committee a document containing a tabular comparison of the two draft treaties (ENDC/175); unfortunately this Committee, because of Soviet opposition, has not been able to base on that document a search for common points or points of similarity. My delegation remains convinced that such work would be useful, indeed necessary; it hopes that the Soviet delegation itself will in the end be convinced of this.

It is for this reason that the Italian delegation wishes to submit today a memorandum (ENDC/179) in order to emphasize its point of view and to enable the Committee and the General Assembly of the United Nations, if they see fit, the more easily to take it into account. This memorandum has been circulated and does not, I think, call for any special explanations. It draws attention to the similarities which in our view exist, especially in regard to: first of all, the preamble; secondly, articles I and II prohibiting the manufacture of nuclear weapons; thirdly, articles V and VI containing the general provisions.

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In urging a comparative examination of the two draft treaties we naturally do not wish to neglect the memorandum on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons submitted by the eight non-aligned delegations last year (ENDC/158), or that which has just been submitted (ENDC/178) and which we shall study with the greatest attention.

We know that in this regard -- the position of the non-aligned delegations -- two problems arise. The first is that of the agreements on nuclear disarmament which would have to be associated with the concluding of a treaty on non-proliferation or follow it closely. To that end this Committee has continued to study the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and the "cut-off", which appear to be the first measures that could most easily be adopted in order to establish the balance desired by the non-aligned countries between their obligations and those of the nuclear countries.

The second problem is that of the security guarantees to be given to the non-aligned countries which undertook to renounce nuclear weapons. This problem has been envisaged by the Committee in a concrete manner on the basis of the interesting proposals submitted by both sides. We have already commented on them at a previous meeting (ENDC/PV.272, p.30.)

Today the delegation of Ethiopia has submitted a document (ENDC/180) which the Committee will certainly examine with the closest attention and the keenest interest. We have already expressed our own views on guarantees during our meeting on 12 July, when we stated that it would be necessary to devise a system which, without affecting the condition of non-alignment, could give positive and active guarantees to the countries lacking the guarantees of an alliance (ENDC/PV.272, p.30.). The principal role in this matter naturally devolves upon the United Nations, which should, through the means at its disposal, provide the formulas for the desired guarantees.

On the other hand, let us remember the "mutual examples". Although the matter may naturally be quite different, this precedent is not without value. Thanks to "mutual examples", it has been noted that sometimes spontaneus, non-contractual decisions are easier than obligations assumed under a treaty. This could be true in several fields and also where guarantees are concerned. It is by a unilateral declaration that President Johnson has already expressed provisions which go beyond those indicated by the Soviet Union. If a similar declaration were also made by the Soviet Union, as we hope, the Committee could arrive, with the sanction of the United Nations and within its framework, at a harmonious system of guarantees which, through its balance, could not in the least affect the status of the non-aligned.

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This mention of unilateral declarations leads me to speak, before I close, about the nuclear moratorium. The Committee will remember that last year the Italian delegation submitted a draft unilateral declaration of non-acquisition of nuclear weapons (ENDC/157) which the Italian delegation explained during our 232nd meeting. It was later examined by the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which expressed its interest in and appreciation of our initiative. The document submitted by Italy to this Committee was mentioned in resolution 2028 (XX) of the General Assembly of the United Nations as one of the working documents assigned to the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

In this connexion, while remaining fully confident that the efforts to conclude a non-proliferation treaty will yield a positive result, we should like to recall the possibility of a partial and transitional solution of the problem, if its permanent solution by the treaty which we all desire is unduly delayed.

At our meeting on 22 February the representative of Ethiopia, Mr. Aberra, manifested some perplexity about the possibility and utility of a moratorium (ENDC/PV.242, pp.17, 18). That, I believe, was his initial reaction. I hope that the representative of Ethiopia will be good enough to reconsider the idea which we recommended and that he will appreciate the value of the intentions which inspired it. I agree, of course, with Mr. Aberra that the moratorium is not -- as I have already said -- a perfect and final solution of the problem of non-proliferation. We are the first to admit that the solution envisaged by the moratorium is a limited and temporary one and that the true solution to the problem of non-proliferation lies in the conclusion of a treaty.

Nevertheless, we believe that, if the conclusion of such a treaty were long delayed, the moratorium would be a way that would deserve to be attentively explored with the help, co-operation and encouragement of the nuclear countries. Indeed, I share also the opinion of the representative of Ethiopia that, if a moratorium were established, the nuclear countries themselves ought to contribute to it, either by achieving other disarmament agreements or by refraining from any action which, by

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taking advantage of their nuclear status, would be prejudicial to the non-nuclear countries. This legitimate expectation, moreover, applies also where non-proliferation is secured within the framework of a treaty.

On the other hand, during the discussions on the non-proliferation treaty certain requirements became apparent which could also affect, at least partially, the moratorium plan. Some of the obstacles which were noted during the discussions on the treaty would also arise in relation to a temporary renunciation of nuclear weapons. It is for those reasons that the Italian delegation, after studying attentively the difficulties which have appeared in regard to the treaty, is of the opinion that it would perhaps be appropriate that the idea of a moratorium should be better specified and elaborated. In other words, our moratorium might require a better and wider formulation, particularly as regards the problems relating to (1) the duration of the moratorium; (2) the definition of "control" of nuclear weapons; (3) the security of the countries which undertook to renounce these weapons.

Those are the considerations regarding our past work and our future work which I wished to submit to the Committee on the eve of its adjournment, leaving aside any spirit of polemics and endeavouring to view objectively the state of our discussions. The difficulties which we have encountered in our negotiations and have not been able to overcome are in part real and objective; in part they are due to the climate of mistrust which still persists among us despite our efforts. Our Committee should be an active factor working to eliminate the suspicions and to restore a climate of mutual confidence.

I believe that in that respect it has not failed in its task. Even if we have not made much progress on the practical level of the conclusion of agreements, we have, I believe, taken some not insignificant steps towards a better mutual understanding, which is at the very basis of all disarmament. If that is true, if that statement is, as I hope, not rash or too optimistic, our work is a valuable contribution to peace and is slowly but surely preparing a better future.

Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): In my capacity as the most recent chairman of the informal meetings of representatives of the non-aligned States members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, I have the honour to present today a joint memorandum by those eight States (ENDC/178). Through the kind assistance of the Secretariat, it has already been reproduced and circulated as a conference document, and therefore I take it for granted that I need not read it out. We wish this document, like the one submitted last week on a comprehensive test ban (ENDC/177), to be annexed to the forthcoming report of this session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

Needless to say, our decision to submit this memorandum has grown out of the belief that everything must be done to overcome the present impasse in regard to the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons. To quote just one phrase from the memorandum: We --

"... view with apprehension the possibility that such a situation" -- that is, a situation without an agreement preventing such proliferation -- "may lead not only to an increase of nuclear arsenals and to a spread of nuclear weapons over the world, but also to an increase in the number of nuclear weapon Powers, thus aggravating the tensions between States and the risk of nuclear war."  
(ENDC/178, p.2)

Mr. ABERRA (Ethiopia): I have listened with great attention to the intervention of the representative of Italy, who referred to the remarks I made at a previous meeting regarding the subject of a moratorium (ENDC/PV.242, pp.17,18). That subject has been mentioned several times and was elaborated upon today by him. However, I should like to add this brief remark on the comments made today. In view of our earlier statement that past moratoriums -- such as the one we mentioned, the Locarno moratorium -- had proved to be a great tragedy, I should like to ask the representative of Italy what would be the use of such a moratorium in territories which have now declared their regions denuclearized.

If we take the continent of Africa: we have a situation where in South Africa there is flagrant flouting of the basic human rights set forth in the United Nations Declaration; in central Africa there have been unilateral declarations which have similarly flouted those human rights which we have all pledged ourselves to uphold; and in north Africa there is a situation not of peace but of armistice. I would ask the representative of Italy what use the unilateral declaration of a moratorium without any international provisions for the security of such regions would have as regards international security.

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However, from the statement that the representative of Italy made today I observe that he has noted the necessity to consider the security needs of such regions; and I hope that that will be elaborated further. We are happy that at least in that direction the Italian delegation and the Ethiopian delegation have come at this late hour of the session to a meeting of minds.

Those remarks bring me to the subject of the memorandum (ENDC/180) which the Ethiopian delegation has submitted for the consideration of this Committee in regard to the denuclearization of Africa, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the proposed international conference to give effect to such proposals. The memorandum has been circulated as a Conference document, but as some of the ideas it contains are relatively new, I should like to go through it with the Committee, reading the text and giving my comments.

"In view of the unimpeded progress of underground testing, and the proliferation of nuclear testing by non-adherents to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Ethiopian delegation, as one of the Non-aligned states who have sponsored the Banning of Nuclear Weapons, and as one of the countries who have declared for the denuclearization of Africa at the Addis Ababa Summit Meeting, 25th May, 1965, feels an increasingly heavy burden of responsibility to see that certain measures of collective security are guaranteed and commonly arrived at by the International Community. At this meeting the African Heads of States 'unanimously convinced of the imperious and urgent necessity of coordinating and intensifying their efforts to contribute to the achievement of a realistic disarmament programme through the signing by all the states concerned of a treaty of General Complete Disarmament under strict and effective international control' declared their readiness for a denuclearized zone in Africa.

"In our intervention on 22 February this year we stated 'that certain remnants of colonialism and racial prejudice may bring the nuclear danger to Africa, and for this reason we feel that it is the urgent task of this Committee to come to terms with the perilous world of rockets in which we live.' (ENDC/PV.242, p.21). Since then the conflicts in Africa and Asia have continuously been on a sharp edge. Other delegations have indicated for international security measures in their regions: delegation of Burma (ENDC/PV.250, pp.30-31; delegation of Nigeria ENDC/PV.235, p.31, and UAR ENDC/PV.235, p.36.

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"History recalls that weapons of mass destruction were used in international wars not only on the principal belligerents of the war, but also on defenceless peoples and territories; it will be recalled that poison gas was not used in the last war by the major powers on each other, but by the Fascist regime on the defenceless people of Ethiopia. It would seem, therefore, that a step in the direction of banning weapons of mass destruction against non-nuclear weapon countries would be a step towards banning nuclear warfare and the control of the arms race.

"It has been recorded that since the year 650 B.C. there have been more than 1600 known arms races -- and only 1 in 100 of these arms build-ups did not end in a war. The Arms Race of today is furthermore of staggering magnitude -- nuclear warheads with a capacity to kill 300 million in one hour are piled to destroy mankind. Ubiquitous Polaris missiles, one of which can carry explosives equivalent to all the bombs dropped by all sides in the whole of World War II, have made the danger imminent to all regions -- especially in the Far and Middle East. We cannot help but recall that the last two World Wars started in regions like Sarajevo, Manchuria and Ethiopia.

"The General Assembly of the United Nations has on several resolutions, and lately in Resolution A/RES/1653(XVI), given serious consideration to this matter; and further, the Secretary General in his letter to this Conference, Doc./ENDC/161, in his final passage, has transmitted the decision of the General Assembly of its 1388th meeting on 3rd December 1965, to refer to item 29, viz. 'Question of Convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons' for further study.

"The Secretary General has also sent to this Conference for its orientation the Resolution of the General Assembly for a World Conference on Disarmament, A/RES/2030(XX) and the resolution welcoming the denuclearization of Africa (A/RES/2033 (XX)).

"The Ethiopian delegation, after studying the Resolution mentioned above, have hoped that with a possibility of a Disarmament World Conference, the banning of the use of nuclear weapons will also be undertaken at such a conference. For this reason the Ethiopian delegation, both in New York and here (Geneva) have been anticipating results of the negotiations about the Conference, which to date has not been forthcoming.

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"However, the response to the declaration for a denuclearized Africa through an International treaty under the auspices of the United Nations as stated by African Heads of State and Government in July 1964, has, in view of the Ethiopian delegation, been most encouraging. This declaration was endorsed on 10 October 1964 by the Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned countries at their second conference in Cairo. The messages that have been received by the ENDC from the President of the United States (ENDC/165, p.2) and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union (ENDC/167) offering to 'protect from nuclear attack or threat' and 'not to use' on denuclearized zones, respectively, have been a great stimulus for the denuclearization of the world by regions. It is for this propose that my August Sovereign Haile Selassie I acknowledged the initiative for peace, and proposed an International Agreement under the auspices of the United Nations (ENDC/171) in accordance with the declaration of the African Heads of State of July 21, 1964.

"The Ethiopian delegations spare no effort to explore all avenues for peace. As early as 1962 our representative, Mr. Alemayehou, was saying 'we urge the nuclear powers to persist in their efforts to reach agreement at least on partial measures' (ENDC/PV.78). The Romanian delegation has also urged a step-by-step approach towards nuclear banning (ENDC/PV.239). Other delegations have acknowledged the necessary connexion between the declaration of denuclearized zones and the responsibilities of the nuclear powers to respect them, as expressed in the United Nations resolution 2033 (XX). The Ethiopian delegation regrets to note, however, that if we fail to make the resolutions of the United Nations effective, they will increasingly cease to be of any value. It is to this danger we referred 'our duty to bridge the gap between man's modern nuclear dilemma and his inadequate organization for international control and enforcement of any agreement we may reach' (ENDC/PV.242). The hope of providing the power needs of all the neutral countries represented here for seven years with only a 100 kilograms of nuclear power in what has been described as the 'dawn of a nuclear age', is still in the distance if we cannot first organize a First-Aid Fire Brigade Service in a case of a nuclear outbreak.

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"It has seemed to the Ethiopian delegation during our deliberations of last year that the denuclearization of regions which are already nuclearized is handicapped, firstly, that confidence has not been established yet for the inspection of its operations, and secondly, by leaving an alliance without membership to any other collective Security System. This has been the case, particularly in Central Europe, where the major power groupings face a confrontation in divided non-United Nations member territory. It would seem, therefore, as a strategy of peace that a great deal of constructive work could be done in areas which now offer possibilities of negotiation for regional security. The Ethiopian delegation still believes that today more than ever the adage that 'peace is indivisible' holds true. Non-nuclear weapon states cannot feel secure if the nuclear powers are not bound by international agreement, as in Asia, and nuclear powers cannot feel secure either if territories can suddenly be a nuclear port as in Cuba. There is, however, the urgent necessity of an International Agreement for the security of denuclearized regions who are ready for collective security under the principles and auspices of the United Nations.

"The Ethiopian delegation, after studying the prospects of negotiating such an agreement, have considered the following criteria as basis for such an agreement:

- "1. The use of nuclear weapons in general against denuclearized territories of regions should be banned, as a first step towards the banning of nuclear thermonuclear weapons and General and Complete Disarmament.
- "2. That non-nuclear weapon countries, where appropriate and feasible, should denuclearize their territories and/or regions, according to the Resolutions of the United Nations, e.g. Resolution 2033 (XX) -- for the denuclearization of Africa.
- "3. That nuclear weapon countries should jointly or severally recognize their responsibility to come to appropriate Guarantee Agreement on the basis of the considerations mentioned in 1. and 2. above.
- "4. That such agreements should be endorsed by the United Nations and operated through a body of the United Nations under the principles of the Charter.

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"5. Any breach of such agreements should be verified by a panel of impartial observers nominated by the United Nations from parties concerned, and names registered with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, facilities for detection and observation being provided for such a panel by all concerned."

Here I may say that we owe a great deal to the suggestion by the Swedish delegation for a "club" (ENDC/154), which is incorporated in that article, and also to the efforts and ideas which have been the basis for all the United Nations observation teams that have been working in Asia, in the Middle East and in other regions. We are also happy to note that the same idea has been promoted by an ex-Minister for Commonwealth Relations of the United Kingdom, Mr. Sandys.

"6. That the denuclearization of territories or regions should not deter, or be an impediment towards the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under I.A.E.A. safeguards, or any other United Nations organization adequate for the purpose with objective and non-discriminatory criteria.

"7. That in the absence of agreement to halt the nuclear arms race or to ban nuclear arms in all regions, the urgency for all non-nuclear-weapon States who have declared for denuclearization to press for an agreement of an International Treaty under United Nations auspices in settlement of this impending crisis to ensure their security be recognized.

"For the above considerations, and for other considerations that delegations may well add for the cause of international security, the Ethiopian delegation appeals for a resolution of the General Assembly which gives particular attention to the reduction of the regions of tension in the world, proceeding from tension areas which have no international protection, and as declared by African Heads of State and Government, 21 July 1964, are willing to come to an international agreement under the auspices and effective operation of the United Nations.

"In reviewing past efforts in this direction we are happy to note that it was President Truman who expressed the hope, now over twenty years ago, that international arrangements could be agreed upon that would make it possible for all nations to renounce the use of atomic energy for military purposes, which was followed on 14 June 1946, by Mr. Baruch, United States representative at the

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United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, by a proposal of nuclear weapons through an international authority. The Ethiopian delegation, it will be remembered, sponsored the resolution against the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons at the 16th session of the General Assembly. The delegation of the Soviet Union have repeatedly called for an effective agreement on this issue.

"By 17 October 1963, the world had attained to having a United Nations General Assembly resolution banning nuclear weapons in the region of outer space" -- resolution 1884(XVIII). "The Ethiopian delegation recalls the basic approach of the Soviet Government in recognizing the faith that the non-nuclear-weapon States have put in the commitments to the principles of the United Nations, and their increasing role and responsibility in this organization. It welcomes the joint US/USSR statement of 20 September 1961, UN Doc.A/4879 which foresees the necessity of 'an International Disarmament Organization, including all parties to the agreement should be created within the framework of the United Nations'.

"The Ethiopian delegation, like other delegations, have discussed to support the Resolution of the United Nations calling for a World Conference on Disarmament; in view of certain declarations, however, we recognize the obstacles for convening such a conference in the immediate future, with the participation of all nuclear countries. However, we do not believe that this situation should veto the progress for collective security by initial control of nuclear weapons, in regions where it would be possible and necessary today, and for this cause, establishing the necessary disarmament organization, concurrently with an agreement to ban nuclear weapons in denuclearized zones, as a step towards complete and general disarmament.

"We pray therefore all nations who out of the destructions of the past World Wars have built by their combined pledge, the United Nations for the peace and justice of mankind, will spare no efforts to take the steps necessary for Collective Security. The Ethiopian delegation believes that African nations have shown a way by putting faith in the International Community of the United Nations, in their declaration for the denuclearization of Africa through an international agreement, under United Nations auspices." (ENDC/180)

At the beginning of this session Mr. Trivedi, the representative of India, recalled to us the failures of disarmament negotiations, quoting from a letter from Mr. Nehru (ENDC/PV.240, p.20). It has taken another world war in which millions had to be sacrificed, as was so tellingly recalled by Mr. Roshchin in his statements, to establish the principles on which the United Nations was founded.

(Mr. Aberra, Ethiopia)

Today we are in a new, nuclear age which has developed since the signing of the United Nations Charter and which now needs new initiative and organization to safeguard the principles of the United Nations and to ban the use of force, which is contrary to those principles which we have solemnly declared we shall defend. We believe that for that purpose the African States have made the necessary sacrifice and act of faith in their declaration with regard to denuclearization under an international agreement reached through the United Nations.

Mr. TRIVEDI (India): The Indian delegation would like to make a brief intervention this morning to congratulate the Ethiopian representative on his constructive and important statement and to welcome the initiative taken by him in presenting a memorandum on the question of prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and on other allied matters (ENDC/180).

The Government of India, in common with the majority of the Members of the United Nations, subscribed to the declaration contained in resolution 1653 (XVI) and voted for the resolution. That resolution requested the Secretary-General to consult the Governments of the Member States in order to ascertain their views on the possibility of convening a conference to sign a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons for war purposes.

The Government of India has always been, and continues to be, totally opposed to the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and is convinced that the total prohibition of such use is essential to the welfare and, indeed, the survival of humanity. In its reply to the United Nations Secretary-General the Government of India, therefore, reaffirmed its support of the resolution and added that the proposed convention to be effective, would require the active support of all States, particularly of States possessing such weapons.

That proposition has remained constantly before the United Nations, and at the last session the General Assembly desired that it should be referred again to this Committee for further consideration (ENDC/161, p.2). The problem has been given some attention by the Committee during the current session, particularly as it has assumed special importance in the context of the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, to which the Committee has devoted most of its discussion and debate.

The Indian delegation would like to take this opportunity to make a special reference to important messages received by this Committee during its session this year, which have a bearing on this specific issue. First, there was the message of 1 February from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (ENDC/167). In his message Chairman Kosygin announced the Soviet

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

Government's willingness to include in the draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons a clause on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which have no nuclear weapons in their territory.

The second message to the Committee was from His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia on 1 March. In his message, His Imperial Majesty referred to the message from Chairman Kosygin and to President Johnson's assurance of strong support to non-nuclear nations against nuclear blackmail, and said:

"In view of the fact that the present nuclear possession and proliferation could be a serious danger to the security of mankind, we believe that such a commitment against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, by all nuclear Powers, would help to make a great step forward in the attempt to reach an agreement on disarmament" (ENDC/171).

The Indian delegation has welcomed those messages in its earlier interventions in the Committee.

The Ethiopian representative has now submitted to the Committee a memorandum based on United Nations General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) and on the message from His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia. As we have stated already, the Indian delegation voted for resolution 1653 (XVI) and gave its constructive views to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the question raised in that resolution. Therefore the Indian delegation welcomes the initiative taken by the Ethiopian representative and trusts that it will receive the support of the Committee.

In his memorandum the Ethiopian representative has also emphasized the importance of demilitarized territories and/or regions, where appropriate and feasible. That is also in accordance with the views of the United Nations. As far as the question of demilitarized territories is concerned, a non-nuclear-weapon country is a demilitarized territory. With regard to the problem of regions, it is a matter of considerable regret that the region of which my country is a part, and which was till recently a demilitarized zone, has since exploded into a nuclearized zone. We trust that it may not yet be too late for the entire continent of Asia to return to the path of nuclear sanity. Other regions -- for example, the States of Africa and Latin America -- are in a more fortunate position, and the Indian delegation has watched with interest, sympathy and admiration the efforts being made by them towards reaching agreements on demilitarization. The Indian delegation wishes them early success in their endeavours.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

The Indian delegation would also like at this stage to make a brief observation on an allied subject to which it has had occasion to allude in the past: the principle of the renunciation of force for the settlement of disputes. The Indian delegation referred to this at our 240th meeting, and, speaking on 14 July in this Committee, the Minister of State for External Affairs of India said:

"If we can all agree as a beginning to give up the use of force, then perhaps a climate will be created in which there will be greater understanding, less suspicion and no fear". (ENDC/PV.273, p.7.)

That is in fact what the Charter of the United Nations enjoins us to observe. The Indian delegation hopes, therefore, that that idea, which has been discussed in the Committee in the past, will receive renewed and active support at our future sessions.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): We have heard a number of interesting statements today. My delegation will of course study them carefully. In particular, I should like to take note of the memorandum (ENDC/178) of the non-aligned countries on non-proliferation; we shall study that memorandum with great care. We welcome the fact that our colleagues of the eight non-aligned countries are continuing to make important contributions to the work of this Committee as they have in the past.

We have been working for a long time on non-proliferation. We have not yet been able to come to an agreement, but we think we are making progress. We are therefore at a stage in our deliberations where it is important that we avoid the temptation of engaging in charges and countercharges. Paradoxically, that temptation is particularly great for the very reason that we have made progress towards agreement but have not yet succeeded in reaching it. The closer we come to success the more impatient we naturally become.

However, we must not let impatience lead us into the dreary business of trying to fix on one side or the other the blame for the fact that we have not finally achieved agreement. To do so would be to degrade the seriousness with which every member of this Committee has attacked the difficult problems which confront us in attempting to negotiate a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Even worse, it would make the solution of those problems more difficult in the period which lies ahead.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

The problems we face are difficult ones. Everyone here is aware of the areas in which the difficulties lie; everyone here knows that the answer to those difficulties must be found in what the President of the United States has called "an acceptable compromise" between the United States and the Soviet Union "in language which we can both live with" (ENDC/PV.276, p.12). When the President of the United States said a little more than six weeks ago, "We are doing everything we can to reach an agreement" on a treaty, and "We are very anxious" to do so, one might ask what is the point of Mr. Roshchin's charging that the United States is trying to "draw out and hamper" the solution? Is it accurate to say, as Mr. Roshchin said: "No progress has been made in the Committee in solving the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" (ENDC/PV.282, p.16)? Is it really true, as Mr. Roshchin has charged, that we are in the same position now as we were in January of this year?

The United States does not believe that that is the case. The United States believes that, as part of our efforts in searching for an acceptable compromise on the issues which divide us, we have made substantive progress in clarifying and defining the area in which that compromise might be found. This Committee has made progress in considering, and moving towards resolving, issues which are essential to the concluding of a non-proliferation treaty.

For that reason I was most sorry to hear Mr. Roshchin's remark at our meeting on 16 August that throughout the present session of the Committee "the United States has compelled us to waste time (ibid., p.18). That is a charge which I must reject with all the vigour at my command. I should like to point out the variety of issues with which this Committee has dealt. I should like to point out that these are issues which must be explored and resolved if we are to have serious negotiations towards a treaty.

At our 277th meeting the United States set forth its views concerning the international safeguards which would effectively support a non-proliferation treaty. We made those remarks, and invited comment on them, because we believe that exploration of the issue of safeguards can contribute to our non-proliferation efforts. I note that that issue is dealt with also in the memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries (ENDC/178) which the Swedish representative presented this morning. In

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

referring to paragraph 2(d) of United Nations General Assembly resolution 2028(XX), that memorandum states that "provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty ... should guarantee compliance with the obligations of the treaty" (ibid., p.3). I would ask the members of this Committee whether they consider discussion of the issue of safeguards to be a waste of time.

At our 280th meeting the United States delegation set forth the relationship of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes to non-proliferation. That question was introduced because we cannot avoid the inescapable technological fact that a nuclear explosive device intended for peaceful purposes can be used as a weapon -- or can be easily adapted for such use -- and that the technology of making nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is essentially indistinguishable from the technology of making nuclear weapons. If we are seriously working for a non-proliferation treaty, and I believe we all are, we must face up to that fact and the implications it has for our work. I would ask the members of this Committee whether they consider it a waste of time to discuss the difficult problems which nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes present in regard to our non-proliferation efforts.

At many of our meetings the United States delegation -- as well as others -- has discussed the value of having a non-proliferation treaty contain adequate assurances that non-nuclear-weapon States would not obtain nuclear weapons by manufacturing them for themselves. That is certainly a basic subject for consideration by our Committee. Indeed one of our highly respected colleagues, the representative of Mexico, has stated that the great danger is not that nuclear-weapon States will give the bomb to non-nuclear-weapon States, but that the various States already possessing the necessary resources may sooner or later join the "atomic club" through their own efforts (ENDC/PV.242, p.10). The United States agrees with that appraisal, and I ask the members of this Committee whether they consider discussion of that subject to be a waste of time.

At our meeting of 31 March (ENDC/PV.253, p.15) the United States delegation observed that Soviet-built nuclear delivery systems had apparently been deployed in certain Warsaw Pact States -- at least they have been demonstrated in parades and in training exercises. Parenthetically I might add that cruise missiles, along with new and improved rockets for delivery of nuclear weapons, were displayed in Warsaw as

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

recently as 22 July of this year, the millennium of the Polish State. At our meeting on 28 June (ENDC/PV.268, p.11) Mr. Foster asked specifically whether the Soviet Union gave its allies those nuclear delivery vehicles without any information concerning how they should be used or how to defend against similar weapons. Are we wrong in assuming that the crews that accompany those missiles are trained to do somewhat more than demonstrate them in parades? We have put the question to the representative of the Soviet Union whether the arrangements under which those nuclear delivery systems were made available constituted proliferation (ENDC/PV.253, p.14). In view of the interest of all of us in a fair application of a non-proliferation treaty to alliances, I ask the members of the Committee whether they consider discussion of those problems to be a waste of time.

At our meeting on 22 March the representative of the United Kingdom pointed out that official publications of the Soviet Union had indicated that cardinal questions of the defence of the Warsaw Pact countries were reviewed by the Political Consultative Committee within the Warsaw Pact (ENDC/PV.250, p.18). At a subsequent meeting the United States delegation pointed out that "cardinal questions of defence" certainly included questions of the use of nuclear weapons, and asked whether or not the Soviet Union considered this as constituting proliferation (ENDC/PV.253, p.14). Mr. Foster stated at our meeting on 28 June that there had been repeated reports of meetings of defence ministers of Warsaw Pact member countries. He asked: "Do those ministers never talk among themselves about the use of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union or any other country?" (ENDC/PV.268, p.11) In view of the vital interest of us all in a fair application of a non-proliferation treaty to alliance structures, I again ask the members of this Committee whether they consider discussion of those problems to be a waste of time.

At many of our meetings the United States has pointed out that the cut-off of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons, which has been proposed by the United States and strongly supported by many delegations at the Conference, is a collateral measure which could be described as most germane to the subject of a durable non-proliferation programme. The United States has urged support of that measure as one which should accompany a non-proliferation treaty, although we do not believe that the two should be linked.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

Here I should note that the memorandum on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons introduced this morning by our colleague from Sweden indicates that the eight non-aligned countries consider that a non-proliferation treaty should be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race (ENDC/178, p.3). They indicated that an agreement for the complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes was one of the tangible steps which they had in mind. They went further and pointed out that such a step would itself be a non-proliferation measure. I ask the members of this Committee whether they consider that discussing a complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes would be a waste of time in connexion with a discussion of the non-proliferation question.

I submit that discussion and resolution of those important issues is far from being a waste of time. It is necessary work that must be done before we can arrive at a lasting non-proliferation treaty. When all the issues separating us have been resolved, I would venture to say, everyone here, including our colleagues from the Soviet Union, will come to realize how much we have actually cleared away in the course of our deliberations during this session.

All of us in this Committee remember, I am sure, that the test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) was initialled in Moscow after only ten days of negotiations there. I think it is not inappropriate, however, to remind ourselves that that was possible only because of the long and often frustrating labours in this chamber during 1962 and 1963. The test-ban Treaty stands as a proof of the value of the work we are carrying out in this Committee. Our efforts were not fruitless then, though some described them as such, and they are not fruitless now.

That having been said, we must acknowledge that they would have been more fruitful if the Soviet Union had participated more fully in our consideration of the important and significant issues that I am now reviewing. They would have been even more fruitful had the Soviet Union agreed to have the co-Chairmen meet in working out agreed treaty provisions in the areas where agreement could be reached. That idea had wide support in the Conference. Many have spoken in favour of it, and the representative of Italy this morning added his eloquent voice in support of that suggestion when he introduced his memorandum (ENDC/179). Our work was undeniably set back when that request was refused.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

I note that the Soviet Union has characterized the United States draft (ENDC/152 and Add.1) as a treaty which does not prevent proliferation but which regulates it. That is an interesting play on words; but I submit that the issues before us are much too important to be dealt with by a play on words. The central purpose of a non-proliferation treaty is, as the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Cernik, so aptly put it, to prevent any increase in the number of countries that can start a nuclear war. That is what the United States treaty does. In that connexion, both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense of the United States have made it quite clear that no arrangements within NATO are being considered which will change the fact that nuclear weapons of the United States, wherever located, can never be used -- by anyone -- without the express authority of the President of the United States.

I am aware that our Soviet colleague has said that that is not enough, since the authority might be given. However, as I pointed out in my remarks at our meeting on 26 July (ENDC/PV.276, p.11), no nuclear-weapon Power could evade its responsibility by shunting on to some other State the responsibility for firing nuclear weapons. A nuclear war cannot take place unless one of the nuclear-weapon Powers decides that its nuclear weapons should be fired. If it should so decide, it would have to face the possibility of the gravest of conceivable consequences, no matter whence its weapons had been fired.

I could not conclude this portion of my remarks without referring to what I said on 26 July about the confidence which I believe is developing between the major nuclear-weapon States concerning their responsibility in the management of this awesome power. I said then (ibid.), and I say now, that we both know that, with the overwhelming nuclear might which we each have at our disposal, judgement and responsibility are truly inescapable -- and I should like to emphasize that in my remarks today.

It is true, however, that our Soviet colleague has painted a dark picture of our work in this Committee. He has said that we have made absolutely no progress on non-proliferation. One is tempted to ask oneself: why did he make that statement? One reason, of course, may be that he is close to abandoning all hope of a treaty. I do not believe that that is the reason. Further, I believe that he will come to realize that the consideration we have been giving to basic and serious issues essential to a non-proliferation treaty has gone a long way in advancing us towards our objective.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

Another reason may lie in our colleague's awareness that the United States is prepared to compromise on key differences and his awareness of his own unwillingness or inability to match movement on our side with movement on his. Can it be that his professed low evaluation of the work of this Committee and of the prospects for future success is being used as a means of exerting maximum pressure on the United States?

There is nothin new in a negotiating technique of that sort; but any party to a negotiation employing such tactics takes a serious risk. The sound of doom may be rung so convincingly that other participants in the negotiations will not see any realistic opportunity for mutual compromise and adjustment. I submit, therefore, with the greatest respect, that the Soviet delegation may be taking upon itself an increasingly dangerous responsibility if it is pursuing such tactics; and I cannot believe that it wants to carry them to the point where the ultimate successful outcome of our negotiations is placed in jeopardy.

There is a safer path to success. That is the path of compromise, the path which President Johnson indicated in his statement of 5 July, a statement with which we are all familiar. It is a path which properly involves mutual adjustment, understanding and movement on both sides.

I cannot conclude my remarks -- urging both sides, as I do, to seek to work out our negotiations in a spirit of compromise -- without making clear exactly what I mean by "compromise". The word "compromise" in the English language has the primary meaning of an adjustment of differences in which each side yields something in the interest of reaching an agreement. It has, of course, a secondary meaning which is far less acceptable to anyone as a basis for reaching agreement: that is, to lay one's principles open to criticism or disrepute. We use the word in that sense when we speak of compromising one's character or compromising one's good name. It would be tragic indeed if problems of semantics were to interfere in any way with our attempts to reach agreements; and it is for that reason, in order to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding, that I should like to suggest another word to convey the true spirit in which the President of the United States made his remarks on 5 July. That word is

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

"rapprochement", and it is truly descriptive of his desire to reach agreement. "Rapprochement" indicates a readiness by each side -- to the extent that the other is ready -- to walk its part of the way towards reaching mutual understanding. That is what the President meant when he spoke of "compromise" on 5 July. That is the spirit in which I hope we shall approach resolution of the differences which lie between us.

Mr. LAHODA (Czechoslovakia): The dull weather that we have had during the past two months far from corresponds to our idea of a summer full of warmth and sunshine. There are various views about such rigorous whims of nature. Explanations differ greatly, and not infrequently we hear the voices of ordinary people expressing the belief that the artificial interventions of man into the natural course of nature through nuclear research have influenced the traditional climates in different parts of the world. That explanation certainly does not correspond to reality, although it is characteristic of the thinking of the man in the street at a time of nuclear bomb explosions and the testing of the most modern missiles. It only indicates that, in trying to explain an unpleasant, cold and rainy summer, people often seek the causes where in fact they do not lie.

The situation, however, is quite different with regard to the unfavourable climate existing this year in this Committee. Here we are not, as in the case of natural phenomena, concerned with unknown and to a considerable extent haphazard and inexplicable movements or influences which suddenly cause a cooling down and prevent the normal developments which we are used to in the season or expect at harvest time. While explanations of the causes of bad weather may differ, the reasons for the failure of the deliberations of this Committee are unequivocal. They lie in the increasingly aggressive policy of the United States and the related arms race and the unwillingness of the Western Powers to agree to any measures that would lead to a slowing-down of the arms race and to a relaxation of international tensions.

It is precisely the general orientation of the foreign policy of the United States and the consequent approach of that country's delegation to the solution of the problems facing this Committee that are the cause of the lack of success in the six months of work this year. That has been stated several times during the present session, and there is no need to dwell on it.

(Mr. Lahoda, Czechoslovakia)

In view of today's statement by Mr. Fisher, I should like also to make a few observations on the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. This question involves all the factors conditioning the solution of outstanding international issues. It would be superfluous to give reasons for its urgency in this forum. Our previous discussions have revealed with sufficient clarity the main problems and obstacles in the way of a mutually-acceptable agreement. The submission of the draft treaties (ENDC/152 and Add.1; ENDC/164) and the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2028(XX) (ENDC/161) marked the climax of the preparatory process facilitating business-like discussions.

However, despite the fulfilment of those prerequisites, we have not reached any positive result. The opposing views have remained unchanged; the exchange of views has only facilitated their better exposure. At the same time it has confirmed what the socialist countries have underlined in their previous statements: that the differences are not only in the formulation but also in the basis of the respective concepts of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, and in the concept and the nature of the obligations which individual countries would undertake under the treaty.

The main barrier to the solution of the problem of preventing dissemination is the attempts of the Western Powers, and primarily of the United States, to subordinate the prohibition of the dissemination of nuclear weapons to their political designs. They strive to legalize certain forms of dissemination of nuclear weapons within military groupings -- at the present time in particular the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in the nuclear integration of NATO. That does not mean, however, that the problem is limited to Europe and the relations between the countries members of NATO and those adhering to the Warsaw Treaty. It has a direct impact on all existing alliances and all groupings that might be formed in the future. Accordingly it is a problem of a general nature, with world-wide consequences. Even the memorandum of the non-aligned States (ENDC/178) concludes that it has become the main obstacle to agreement.

(Mr. Lahoda, Czechoslovakia)

Even in the Western countries, including the United Kingdom and the United States, there has been increasing awareness of the fact that the plans for nuclear integration within NATO stand in the way of a non-dissemination agreement. The representatives of those countries have alleged that the share of the Federal Republic of Germany in the nuclear armaments of NATO is indispensable for the safeguarding of the defence capability of Western Europe. It might be well to counter that allegation with the information which has appeared in the United States Press and which is of undoubted credibility: that the United States Department of Defense holds other views.

Those differences of view testify to the fact that nuclear integration within NATO with the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany is motivated, not by defence of the interests of Western Europe, but exclusively by an attempt by certain political circles in the United States, and particularly in the State Department, to meet the demands of the Federal Republic of Germany for nuclear armaments. That is the main reason why our discussions on non-dissemination have not been crowned with success.

The Czechoslovak delegation is aware of the fact that there are other outstanding questions connected with the non-dissemination treaty the importance of which cannot be underestimated. That, after all, has been brought to light by many other speakers. However, in our view, the elimination of the main obstacle of which I spoke earlier would make it easier to find an acceptable solution to the other problems within a short time.

The key to a non-dissemination agreement remains in the hands of the United States. It requires that the United States abandon its original concept, which is directed not towards non-dissemination but, on the contrary, merely towards regulation of the use of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon States which would acquire such weapons from the existing nuclear Powers. Only then will it be possible to conclude a mutually-acceptable agreement. The socialist countries are ready to agree to a reasonable solution at any time. However, such a solution must codify the prohibition of any dissemination of nuclear weapons and must not be a compromise which would lead to the prohibition of only some forms of dissemination and to the legalization of others.

(Mr. Lahoda, Czechoslovakia)

The importance which the Czechoslovak delegation attaches to the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons does not mean that it regards agreement on that question as the final objective of our efforts. It is only one, although at the present time the most urgent, of a number of specific measures the implementation of which would contribute to the salubrity of the international situation and to the lessening of the danger of a nuclear war. It would create more favourable conditions for discussions on general and complete disarmament and, within its framework, for the solution of the key problem --- nuclear disarmament.

In this connexion it is not inappropriate to recall that the importance attached to nuclear disarmament within the framework of general and complete disarmament does not in any way mean underestimating the significance of disarmament measures in the field of conventional weapons. That is proved by the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament and the appropriate revision (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1), which contain a realistic and balanced programme of measures for nuclear and conventional disarmament.

Much attention has been paid to the importance of non-dissemination throughout the whole course of the Committee's discussions on disarmament and in connexion with other measures. It has found its reflexion also in the memorandum of the non-aligned States, which places emphasis on the fact that a non-dissemination treaty would be an integral part of the disarmament process. The Czechoslovak delegation maintains identical views on this question. That is how we understand the principle contained in General Assembly resolution 2028(XX) (ENDC/161) to the effect that nothing in the non-dissemination treaty should affect the right of any group of States to enter into regional treaties for the purpose of securing the total absence of nuclear weapons from their territories.

We believe that the suggestion was very ably formulated by the representative of Mexico in his statement at our meeting on 19 July when he proposed the inclusion of the relevant provision in the non-dissemination treaty (ENDC/PV.274, pp.15, 17). The procedure proposed in Mr. Gomez Robledo's statement might provide a suitable form for expressing the relationship of non-dissemination to other realistic collateral measures concerning nuclear weapons. The non-dissemination agreement might thus become the first link in the chain, which might later be joined by others.

(Mr. Lahoda, Czechoslovakia)

In our view, that should not lead to connecting other collateral measures with the non-dissemination treaty. In the past we have pointed out that the question is very difficult in itself. Attempts to link it with other steps in nuclear disarmament would only complicate the situation and make it difficult to reach agreement both on non-dissemination itself and on the whole complex of questions thus interconnected.

In several weeks' time the report on our unprolific work will be a subject of discussion at the twenty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly. It may be expected that the representatives of the remaining 100 States Members of the United Nations not represented in this Committee will rightly take a critical position as regards our activities. Numerous delegations have pointed that out in the past. The feeling was aptly expressed by the representative of Mexico, Mr. Gomez Robledo, at our meeting on 14 June, when he said:

"Are we going to appear before it" -- that is, the General Assembly -- "once again empty-handed, having been unable to fulfil even one of the items of this triple mandate? And in this gloomy hypothesis ... is it not possible that the General Assembly will refuse to renew once again a mandate which has proved so unfruitful, and prefer to leave the whole question to diplomatic conversations rather than to the negotiating body?" (ENDC/PV.264, p.5)

That idea is certainly not a mere hypothesis. In evaluating the Committee's deliberations and its further prospects the General Assembly will undoubtedly pay regard to the question of whether the continuance of the Committee's work would offer realistic prospects of progress. That depends entirely on the Western Powers. It is for them to facilitate a turn for the better in disarmament negotiations by revising their present approach.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): Our desire to speak today is due to the fact that in the last few days we have heard both some regrettable and some positive statements which we do not consider it possible to pass over in silence. As regards the former, I venture to draw your attention to the following facts.

(Mr. Lukonov, Bulgaria)

The positions of the socialist countries on disarmament questions are being more frequently presented in a wrong light and inaccurately interpreted by the Western delegations. In particular, the point of view of the Bulgarian delegation was misrepresented in the statements made at the meeting of the Committee on 5 July by the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns (ENDC/PV.270, p.12), and the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont (ibid., pp.26 et seq.). We do not think that that way has brought us any closer to clarifying and solving the problems which we are now discussing. A careful perusal of the relevant parts of our statement at the 266th meeting of the Committee would immediately reveal these inaccuracies.

Again quite recently, my statement concerning the importance and effectiveness of one or other of the so-called collateral measures was quoted out of context and in a tendentious way. We have said repeatedly, and we reiterate today, that the situation in the world, the wishes of the majority of countries and the resolutions and recommendations of the United Nations are such that they necessitate the adoption of measures which would really eliminate the danger of war. When this interpretation of ours is called a demand for "all or nothing", we are compelled to state that the Bulgarian Government, while not ceasing to consider general and complete disarmament to be the most reliable guarantee of peace, has always supported and has itself put forward proposals for collateral measures, provided that they would really lead to a relaxation of tension.

The delegation of the Bulgarian Government to the Eighteen-Nation Committee has been guided by these ideas and nobody can prove that it has ever adopted a maximalist position. As early as the meeting of the Committee held on 10 March we declared the following:

"As is well known, we stand for radical solutions in the field of disarmament -- for general and complete disarmament. But we are not maximalists; we have not put, nor do we put now, the question according to the maxim of 'all or nothing'. We are prepared to go towards the goal step by step.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

"Referring to the disarmament negotiations, the Chairman of the Council of Ministries of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Mr. Todor Zhivkov, in the speech which he made in Parliament on 8 December 1965 and which I have already quoted (ENDC/PV.238, p.12), declared that the Government of my country deems it essential to carry out a number of partial measures likely to reduce tension in the world and, at the same time, the danger of war."

(ENDC/PV.247, p.4)

My second comment concerns the attempts to instil the idea that in the Committee there are people who lightheartedly submit disarmament proposals because they themselves have nothing to lose by doing so. Do not measures such as the elimination of nuclear weapons or their prohibition, the establishment of denuclearized zones and a number of similar proposals affect all States, great and small? It is self-evident that if these proposals were implemented, only the advocates of military adventures and the policy "from a position of strength" would lose, but all nations would gain.

Apart from the fact that a Great Power tone is out of place in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, it must be emphasized that there is not a nation that would not lose, for instance, as a result of a nuclear conflict in the world, if it were to come to that. Therefore our common interests oblige all of us to endeavour to accomplish the aims of the Committee. However much one may be aware that the agreement of the Great Powers is a condition sine qua non for any effective disarmament treaty, no one ought to remain silent because his country is a small one and "has nothing to lose" as a result of disarmament.

Lastly, we have witnessed, particularly at today's meeting, the attempts of the Western delegations to do what is known as shifting the blame to the innocent from the guilty and to expose to world public opinion and the United Nations General Assembly someone else as responsible for the failure to carry out the General Assembly's recommendations. But what do the facts show? The facts show, above all, that another year of meetings of the Eighteen-Nations Committee has gone by without any practical results.

But were they possible at all in this year? Yes, they were possible and could have been fairly substantial. It would have been possible to propose to governments an agreed draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It would have been possible to

(Mr. Lukyanov, Bulgaria)

find a basis acceptable to all for extending the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) to cover all tests. It would also have been possible to achieve agreement on a number of other questions of importance from the point of view of the need to turn the course of events away from the dangerous trend towards war on to the path of peaceful coexistence. None of these things were done.

Why? Because of disagreements on trifles or for serious reasons? We believe that it is absolutely essential for each of us to answer that question, and that to do so is decisive for the future success of the disarmament negotiations. If insignificant disagreements, disputes over trifles or form, prevented agreement, then world public opinion would have to condemn all the disputants equally for the lack of results in their work. But if there were differences of principle which prevented agreement, then those who took a position that was wrong in principle should be pointed out frankly and unequivocally with the support of the authority of the whole of world public opinion.

Why, for instance, are we now departing without an agreed draft treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons? The representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roshchin, has answered this question in a convincing and irrefutable manner: because the only draft treaty on genuine non-proliferation -- the Soviet draft -- has been rejected by the Western delegations, led by the delegation of the United States of America. The General Assembly of the United Nations did not propose at its twentieth session that proliferation should be regulated, but that all ways for the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be closed. Who is rejecting that?

Why is there still no common agreement to include underground nuclear tests among those prohibited by the Moscow Treaty of 1963? Because the United States of America and its allies, well knowing how wrong and unacceptable it is to insist on control in foreign territories in cases where such control is not connected with disarmament measures, nevertheless insist on inspections, the purport of which is tantamount to espionage. Nor do they accept certain compromise proposals with which the majority of delegations agree.

Why has the Eighteen-Nation Committee failed to reach agreement to propose the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, or at least a declaration of the nuclear Powers that they will not be the first to use such weapons? Because the United States of America and the United Kingdom will not agree to this, obviously wishing to retain for themselves what is called "a free hand", and, moreover, in such a question as the use of nuclear weapons in general or, what is worse, in the launching of a surprise attack with nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Lukyanov, Bulgaria)

One can raise many more questions deriving from the work of the meetings of the Committee to which the general answer is that the majority of the countries represented here are perturbed by the state of international relations, by the danger of a world war, and are seeking for ways and means of averting it; the United States of America and its NATO allies are blocking systematically and with incredible levity any agreement that would really lead to the relaxation of tension and the ensuring of peace. We think that this should be declared in all bodies interested in bringing about the consolidation of peace.

As a matter of fact the attitude of the United States of America towards certain recommendations of the United Nations cannot be called positive, as can be seen very clearly in the case of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly of 1961 condemning nuclear weapons (A/RES/1653(XVI)), or the resolution of 1965 calling for the closing of "all loop-holes" for the proliferation of nuclear weapons (A/RES/2028(XX); ENDC/161). We should like to hope, however, that that attitude will not be everlasting and that the West will join the majority of countries in common efforts towards better mutual understanding and the conclusion of agreements on proposals with which the agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Committee abounds and which are aimed at eliminating the danger of another world war.

Among the recent positive statements which I mentioned at the beginning of my intervention today we include the documents recently submitted by non-aligned countries (ENDC/177, 178, 180, 183). Although some of the propositions of those documents need further clarification and some ideas appear to us to be open to question, we see in them a sincere desire to help the Committee in its difficult task. We have had an opportunity to express our agreement with many of the compromise proposals of which the documents of the non-aligned delegations have now reminded us.

The search for a compromise based on the principle of the United Nations resolution (A/RES/2032 (XX); ENDC/161) has in most cases been agreed to by the socialist delegations. Everyone remembers, for example, how they assessed in a positive way the proposal of the United Arab Republic for the prohibition of underground explosions above a certain magnitude and for a moratorium on all other explosions until the question of identifying them is finally settled (ENDC/PV.259). One also remembers who has so far been preventing the adoption of this proposal by declaring that the United States of America will not enter into any agreement on underground explosions that does not provide for compulsory on-site inspection.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

It remains for my to say a few words about the proposal of the representative of Ethiopia for banning the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Powers on whose territory there are no such weapons. The Bulgarian delegation sees in Mr. Aberra's proposal an important step towards the establishment of denuclearized zones and the prohibition of nuclear weapons. We hope that this proposal will make it possible to some extent to bring the positions of all delegations closer together, so that they can appear at the twenty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly with constructive proposals in this regard.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania) (translation from French): Since there are no more speakers on the list, if no one else wishes to speak, before reading the communiqué I should like as today's Chairman to read a proposal by the two co-Chairmen of our Committee:

"Considering that after today's meeting there are still a certain number of speakers on the list and that some others may like to speak tomorrow, the co-Chairmen recommend that an additional plenary meeting be held on Wednesday, 24 August, at 10.30 a.m.

"Moreover, the two co-Chairmen recommend that after the completion of the meeting on Wednesday the Committee hold an informal meeting in order to discuss the report to be addressed to the General Assembly and to the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations."

If there is no objection to that proposal, I shall consider it adopted.

It was so decided.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 284th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Vasile Dumitrescu, representative of Romania.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Italy, Sweden, Ethiopia, India, the United States, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria.

"The delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic submitted a joint memorandum on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.\*

"The Italian delegation submitted a memorandum concerning the two draft treaties on non-proliferation.\*\*

"The Ethiopian delegation submitted a memorandum concerning an approach to the realization of United Nations resolutions on the banning of nuclear weapons, the denuclearization of Africa and a world conference on disarmament.\*\*\*

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 24 August 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

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\* Circulated as document ENDC/178

\*\* Circulated as document ENDC/179

\*\*\* Circulated as document ENDC/180

